1. 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996) Mar. 1997 . at 40. 40 ("Sometimes a seemingly minor case can shine a light on the judicial system and reveal much about the workings of the law: how procedural rules can have a powerful real-life significance, how poverty and justice intersect, how even a Supreme Court inclined to defer to the states can be aroused to protect fundamental interests.").
2. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (plurality opinion).
defendant had the right to a free transcript in order to pursue a direct appeal. ' In providing Brooks with a free transcript, the M.L.B. Court found that parental termination cases, although technically civil, are "'quasi criminal in nature"' 4 and therefore fall under Griffin's right of access to the criminal process. Thus, ML.B. can be construed as expanding the fundamental right of access to the criminal process on behalf of the poor. The M.L.B. Court's apparent enlargement of a fundamental constitutional right provoked a vigorous dissent from the Court's more conservative Justices. Justice Thomas, whose dissent was so strident that Chief Justice Rehnquist refused to join part of it, 6 called for the overruling of the Griffin line of cases. 7 Furthermore, Justice Thomas decried the extension of Griffin's right of access from criminal to quasi-criminal cases: "Griffin did not merely invent the free transcript right for criminal appellants; it was also the launching pad for the discovery of a host of other rights. I fear that the growth of Griffin in the criminal area may be mirrored in the civil area." 8 Although Justice Thomas's "fear" about purely civil cases is important, a more pressing concern may be the extension of M.L.B. to the state postconviction appeals of indigent death row inmates such as Georgia's Exzavious Lee Gibson. In September 1996, Gibson represented himself involuntarily before a Butts County judge. Gibson, who is borderline mentally retarded, was too poor to afford an attorney, and Georgia had refused to appoint him counsel for his state postconviction hearing. 9 Gibson's case, which a law firm subsequently took pro bono, is being appealed." 6. Chief Justice Rehnquist refused to join part 11 of Justice Thomas's opinion, which suggested that Griffin should be overruled. See id. at 570 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
7. Justice Thomas wrote: "If this case squarely presented the question, I would be inclined to vote to overrule Griffin and its progeny." Id. at 575 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 577 (citations omitted). Justice Thomas envisaged fee waivers for indigent civil litigants embroiled in paternity suits, custody fights, divorce decrees, zoning ordinance challenges, and foreclosure actions. See id. at 576-77. "In brushing aside the distinction between criminal and civil cases--the distinction that has constrained Griffin for forty years--the Court has eliminated the last meaningful limit on the free-floating right to appellate assistance," Justice Thomas wrote. "I have no confidence that the majority's assurances that the line starts and ends with this case will hold true." Id. at 577-78. In recent years, the Court has been reluctant to invoke the fundamental rights strand of equal protection law to prevent the states from discriminating against the poor. 1 This Note, however, argues that the Court should use M.LB., the fundamental right of access to the criminal process, and wealthbased disparate impact theory to shift the current state of equal protection law so as to provide counsel at state postconviction review for indigent death row inmates such as Gibson.
Part I argues that by relying on Griffin's fundamental right of access to the criminal process, M.LB. could revive wealth-based disparate impact theory. It contends that M.LB. limited the discriminatory purpose or intent requirement of Washington v. Davis,' 2 an equal protection case that has impeded disparate impact challenges. Based on M.LB., this part argues that the Court should recognize a fundamental rights exception to Davis's discriminatory purpose requirement. It asserts that Griffin's fundamental right of access to the criminal process, contrary to Justice Thomas's dissent, is still good law and was not implicitly overruled by Davis.
Part I uses M.LB.'s emphasis on equal protection to argue that indigent death row inmates such as Gibson should receive appointed counsel at state postconviction review. If the Court is going to forbid death row prisoners from filing successive federal habeas petitions, the part argues, the inmates should have counsel their first time through the capital appellate process. Thus, Murray v. Giarratano,1 3 which held that neither the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause nor the Eighth Amendment requires the states to provide death row inmates with counsel at postconviction proceedings, should be overruled. 4 Part II also demonstrates that state postconviction review of death penalty cases triggers Griffin's fundamental right of access to the criminal process under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court, therefore, should recognize and apply a fundamental rights exception in the cases of indigent death row inmates who are in need of counsel at state postconviction proceedings.
I. M.L.B.: THE REVIVAL OF WEALTH-BASED DISPARATE IMPACr THEORY?
Disparate impact, 5 often referred to as "de facto discrimination,"' ' 6 is an equal protection theory concerned with discriminatory effects or results.
Unlike disparate treatment, or de jure discrimination, which is concerned with corrupted policies and processes imbued with discriminatory purpose or intent, disparate impact analysis focuses on facially neutral laws and practices that affect some protected groups more than other groups. For example, a facially neutral standardized test that produces a higher rate of failure among women than among men has a disparate impact on women. t7 Historically, disparate impact cases have focused on racial and ethnic groups. In the 1960s and 1970s, for example, desegregation litigation targeted laws with racially discriminatory effects.' 8 Today, disparate impact challenges are commonly seen in Title VII employment discrimination cases.' 9 Recent disparate impact challenges under equal protection law, however, have failed because Davis's discriminatory purpose requirement limits the Court's level of scrutiny.
Any equal protection challenge to a state law hinges largely on the Court's level of scrutiny. Strict scrutiny, which has been described as "strict" in theory but "fatal" in fact, 20 requires that a law be narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling state interest. To receive strict scrutiny under equal protection, a law must either involve a suspect classification or impinge on a fundamental right. 2 ' Wealth is not a suspect classification. 22 Economic inequality has been redressed by the Court only where it affects rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. 23 The two most frequently recognized fundamental equal protection rights are the right to vote and participate in elections 24 If an equal protection case does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, the law in question will be reviewed under a rational basis test. Laws subject to rationality review require only legitimate state interests and usually are entitled to a "'strong presumption of validity. '-26 In general, unintended wealth-based effects will be ignored; the best chance such effects have of being redressed is if fundamental rights, like the right to vote or the right of access to the criminal process, are at stake.
A. Griffin v. Illinois: The Rise of Wealth-Based Disparate Impact Theory
Beginning in the mid-1950s, the Warren Court began proscribing discrimination based on wealth by announcing fundamental equal protection rights. In Griffin v. Illinois, 27 an Illinois law requiring transcripts prevented two convicted armed robbers from appealing their cases to the state supreme court. A plurality of the Griffin Court, citing the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, held that an indigent criminal defendant's direct appeal cannot be denied because of an inability to afford a transcript. 28 The Court said that although states are not required to provide appellate review, they cannot "discriminate[] against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty. ' 29 Justice Black, writing on behalf of four members of the Court, declared, "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." 3 By justifying his opinion under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, Justice Black ignited a forty-year controversy over the source of the right of access to the criminal process. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Griffin, scheme as racially discriminatory because voting is a fundamental nght).
25. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20 (1956) (plurality opinion) (providing indigent defendants with free transcripts or their equivalent for first appeals as of right): infra Section I.D. In addition to these equal protection rights, the Court has recognized a right to travel, see Shapiro v. Thompson 37 the Court reaffirmed Griffin's reasoning under an equal protection theory. Douglas held that an indigent criminal not only had the right to a free transcript at direct appeal, but also the right to counsel because of the "equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 To the Court's lone dissenter, Justice Clark, Douglas represented a "fetish for indigency. ''39 The majority, viewing the law as a case of "'discrimination against the indigent, ' "4O said counsel represented the difference between a "meaningless ritual" and a "meaningful appeal." 4 '
The Warren Court's concern for the indigent reached new levels when it tried to make wealth a suspect classification in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections. 4 2 Harper struck down a poll tax of $1.50 on all Virginia residents over twenty-one as discriminating against the indigent's right to vote, holding that the tax violated the Equal Protection Clause because voting is a 31. Justice Harlan rejected the idea that the "Equal Protection Clause imposes on the States an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances." Id. at 34 (Harlan, J., dissenting 6 Harper established the right to vote, like Griffin's right of access to the criminal process, as a fundamental equal protection guarantee.
B. The Fall of Wealth-Based Equal Protection
During the 1970s, the Burger Court halted the expansion of fundamental equal protection rights and thwarted any attempts to declare wealth a suspect classification. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 4 7 held that Texas's system of funding public education did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, in part because it did not result in "an absolute deprivation of the desired benefit." 4 Rodriguez said that wealth is not a suspect classification 49 and that education is not a fundamental right on a par with the right to vote or the right of access to the criminal process.5 The Court thus crippled attempts to proscribe discrimination solely on the basis of wealth.
After Rodriguez, the only hope of redressing the effects of economic inequality was through existing fundamental equal protection rights. Washington v. Davis,"' however, curtailed the use of wealth-based disparate impact theory. Several black applicants to the Washington, D.C., police force challenged the validity of a standardized test, which they claimed excluded a disproportionate number of black candidates. 52 M.L.B. addressed the differing interpretations of Washington v. Davis, the scope of the Griffin line of cases, the choice between equal protection and due process, and the future of disparate impact analysis as a means of combating discrimination against the poor. It also gave an indigent Mississippi woman hope that she would regain the right to be a mother to her two children.
The Facts
In 1992, Meredith Lumpkin Brooks and Sammy Lee James were divorced after nearly eight years of marriage. James retained custody of their two children, Samuel and Melissa, who were seven and five at the time. 55 Less than three months later, James remarried. About a year later, he petitioned to terminate Brooks's parental rights so his new wife could adopt the children. In December 1994, a Benton County, Mississippi, chancery court found "clear and convincing proof' of "substantial erosion" of Brooks's relationship to her children, 56 but "cited no specific evidence to support the 53. As Justice White wrote for the 6-3 majority:
[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Id. at 242.
54. The Davis Court said: A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white. decision. 57 Brooks's name was removed from their birth certificates, and she "was decreed, forevermore, a stranger to her children."" Brooks, a twenty-eight-year-old waitress who was making $2.13 an hour plus tips, 59 filed a timely appeal to the state supreme court and paid the requisite $100 filing fee. Several days later, a court clerk estimated that the costs of the transcript fees in her case would be $2,352.36. 6 0 Under Mississippi law, there is a right to an appeal, but only upon payment of costs. 6 Although Justice Kennedy's concurrence relied more heavily on due process, it cannot be the primary source of the Court's opinion for several reasons. First, due process concerns for the indigent are limited in civil cases. The Court has refused to extend Boddie to include bankruptcy actions" or judicial review of welfare benefits,8° and it has limited the state's obligation to provide counsel in parental termination cases." t The M.LB. Court recognized that, under due process, "fee requirements ordinarily are examined only for rationality. The State's need for revenue to offset costs, in the main run of cases, satisfies the rationality requirement." ' Second, due process does not require the state to provide appellate review. 8 3 Although the M.LB. majority disagreed with Justice Thomas's complete rejection of due process," it shared his belief that the Griffin-Douglas line of cases is "best understood as grounded in equal protection analysis. 8 5 The key to M.LB was not only the fairness of the state's judicial process, but also the denial of Brooks's fundamental right of access to the criminal process because of her indigency. While due process is invariably a component of Griffin's right of access, equal protection is at least as important, if not more so. Justice Thomas, however, ultimately rejected the M.LB. Court's equal protection theory because of his desire to overrule Griffin and his overexpansive understanding of Washington v. Davis.
The Fundamental Rights Exception to Washington v. Davis
The future of disparate impact theory is essentially a fight over the scope of the discriminatory purpose requirement of Davis. Discriminatory purpose has been defined as "impl[ying] that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.8 ' A case about racial discrimination in public employment, Davis provided an alternative to the statutory disparate impact theory of employment discrimination presented in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 87 In Griggs, the Court struck down the company's requirement of a high school diploma as not job-related and as discriminating against black employees seeking to move from the company's labor department into higher-paying jobs in other departments. The Griggs Court held that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act did not require a showing of discriminatory purpose. It embraced disparate impact theory by prohibiting "practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." 8 Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion declared that "practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." 89 The holding in Griggs was limited to Title VII employment discrimination "on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification. ' 9 0
The Davis Court distinguished its holding from Griggs by asserting that Title VII did not apply to the Davis petitioners. Furthermore, Davis separated Title VII from the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, requiring a showing of discriminatory purpose in cases based on the latter. Davis did not overrule Griggs, although the Court has subsequently tried to do so. 9 ' Neither Griggs nor Davis discussed anything other than racial discrimination in employment.
The discriminatory purpose requirement, although hotly debated by scholars, 92 has been applied in a number of contexts. Justice Marshall argued that discriminatory purpose is not required to trigger strict scrutiny if fundamental equal protection rights are at stake. Justice Marshall said the discriminatory purpose requirement did not apply to the "fundamental right to equal electoral participation that encompasses vote dilution. ' Under Justice Marshall's conception of Davis, however, it was irrelevent that wealth is not a suspect classification. As a case about the fundamental right of access, M.L.B. did not require a showing of discriminatory purpose. In effect, Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion can be read as accepting Justice Marshall's view and rejecting the respondents' arguments. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the majority that Davis "does not have the sweeping effect respondents attribute to it."' 9 To prove this, Justice Ginsburg cited a disparate impact case upholding the right of access to the criminal process that Justice Marshall had asserted was beyond the pale of Davis." 0 The 121. The petitioner said in her brief: Mississippi could not, consistent with the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment, limit the right of appeal to, for instance, parents who possess assets worth over $200,000, or whose annual income exceeds over $50,000 a year, and leave everyone else to the reason, the mercy, or the whim of a single trial judge. By excluding the petitioner from her appeal, and refusing even to consider her contention that she cannot afford the $2,000 plus price that the State court system is charging for the appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court is doing much the same thing. Brief for Petitioner at 12-13, M.LB. (No. 95-853 The right of access to the criminal process and the right to vote may not be the most treasured rights in the minds of most Americans, 32 and they are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.' 33 These two fundamental equal protection rights, however, are essential to American ideas about democratic self-government. ' They protect what the famous Carolene Products footnote described as the political processes relied on by "discrete and insular minorities.
' 13 ' The Court has recognized that, for a prisoner, "the right to file a court action might be said to be his remaining most 'fundamental political right ... preservative of all rights.""1 36 The government's monopoly power over the right to vote and Griffin's right of access to the criminal process 126. Id. at 375-76; see id. at 376 ("For at that point, the judicial proceeding becomes the only effective means of resolving the dispute at hand and denial of a defendant's full access to that process raises grave problems for its legitimacy."); see also Klarman, supra note II, at 267 ("Thus while the state compels defendants' participation in the criminal justice system and monopolizes meaningful exercise of the franchise, it exerts no equivalent control over food, housing or medical care.").
127. ("Like a defendant resisting criminal conviction, she seeks to be spared from the State's devastatingly adverse action.").
132. See Klarman, supra note II, at 267 ("Only a lawyer, after all, could argue with a straight face that legal assistance in a criminal appeal is more important than, for example, food and shelter.").
133. The right to vote is not guaranteed anywhere in the Constitution. Only the right not to be discriminated against in voting is guaranteed. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 n.78 (1973) (stating that "the right to vote, per se. is not a constitutionally protected right").
134. One M.LB. commentator noted:
[E]qual Protection alone provides principled support for requiring a wiver of appellate costs for indigents; if getting to court is truly "fundamental" to a democratic system-more like voting rights than the amorphous set of "fundamental" interests cognizable under substantive due process-then this interest alone should support a right of equal access. obviate the need for Davis's discriminatory purpose requirement because these rights represent the political voices of the people.
D. Griffin's Fundamental Right of Access to the Criminal Process
Justice Thomas's dissent ignored the government's monopoly power over these fundamental rights by calling for the overruling of Griffin and its progeny. Justice Thomas has claimed Griffin and Douglas were overruled by Davis: "The Davis Court was motivated in no small part by the potentially radical implications of the Griffin/Douglas rationale."' 37 Although there is no denying that Rodriguez and Davis dealt a dual blow to wealth-based equal protection, the Davis Court said nothing of Griffin and Douglas. The Davis Court's references to wealth could be interpreted as dicta, for there is only one oft-quoted reference to discrimination against "the poor" and the fear of widespread economic-based implications.' 38 Justice Thomas, however, used Davis's discriminatory purpose requirement as a catch-all.
The Court has legitimated Griffin's fundamental right of access to the criminal process both before and since Davis. Although there was no fundamental rights strand of equal protection when Griffin was decided in 1956, cases extending the Griffin line during the 1960s acknowledged that the right of access to the criminal process is fundamental. 39 For the first time in twenty years, a majority of the Court has limited Davis's discriminatory purpose requirement. In doing so, M.LB. has reinvigorated the equal protection rationale undergirding the Griffin-Douglas line of cases. Despite the murkiness of the M.LB. Court's reasoning, the Court should use it to recognize a fundamental rights exception to Davis's discriminatory purpose requirement. The fundamental rights exception has the potential to reestablish disparate impact theory as a means of combating the effects of wealth discrimination. How disparate impact theory will apply to other cases depends on several factors: (1) whether the Court explicitly recognizes a fundamental rights exception to Davis; (2) how far the Court is willing to extend the fundamental right of access to the criminal process; and (3) to what extent the Griffin-Douglas-Bounds line of cases remains good law. These are the issues the Court must confront if disparate impact theory is to become a viable legal argument for redressing wealth-based discrimination-not just for parental termination cases, but for the criminal justice system as well. 
II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT CAPITAL STATE POSTCONVICTION REVIEW
If the Court recognizes a fundamental rights exception to Davis's discriminatory purpose requirement, Griffin's fundamental right of access to the criminal process could trigger strict scrutiny of state laws that fail to provide indigent death row inmates with counsel at state postconviction proceedings. This part argues that the Court, because it has limited successive federal habeas petitions, should ensure that death row inmates have counsel the first time through the process. It then contends that Murray v. Giarratano, 5 '
which failed to find a due process or Eighth Amendment right to counsel at capital state postconviction proceedings, should be overruled. Finally, it asserts that state postconviction hearings, like parental termination cases, are quasicriminal and therefore should be protected under Griffin's fundamental right of access to the criminal process.
A. The Court's First-Shot Death Penalty Jurisprudence
Last year, the execution rate in the United States reached a forty-year high.' 52 The Court and Congress have helped the states accelerate the death penalty appeals process by limiting the number of successive federal habeas petitions. 53 The Court's philosophy essentially is that the capital appellate process is a one-shot deal. A convicted death row inmate gets one shot at each phase of the nine-step process that Professor Anthony Amsterdam has referred to as the "assembly line. ' t 4 The assembly line is breaking down at state postconviction review, among other places, 55 because some states refuse to provide indigent death row Capital criminal procedure is a long assembly line, with a long succession of inspectors. The assemblers at the front of the line commonly do a very poor job of assembly, and the inspectors at the front of the line all too often do an equally poor job of inspecting, with the result that later inspectors must repeatedly shunt products off the line, or return them to earlier points for reassembly. Id. Justice Harry Blackmun has referred to this process as the "machinery of death." Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The nine-part process is as follows: (1) trial; (2) direct appeal; (3) appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari; (4) state habeas hearing; (5) state habeas appeal; (6) appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari; (7) federal habeas hearing; (8) federal habeas appeal; and (9) Ct. 1293 Ct. . 1301 Ct. (1996 (holding that a death row inmate's first federal habeas petition must be heard on the merits even if it is filed at the "eleventh hour").
159. This definition of equality is based on Professor Frank Michelman's ideas about "just wants" and "minimum protection." Michelman, supra note 45, at 13. Giarratano Court. 64 In light of M.L.B., Giarratano is due for an equal protection reexamination.
The Holding
In 1985, Joseph M. Giarratano, a Virginia prisoner sentenced to death, filed a civil rights lawsuit on behalf of death row inmates who could not afford attorneys to represent them at state postconviction hearings. This class action suit was prompted by Giarratano's efforts to find a lawyer for Earl Washington, Jr., an indigent and mentally retarded inmate who was scheduled to be executed.' 65 Washington had not exhausted his postconviction remedies because the state had denied his request for an attorney. Under Virginia law, the judge had the discretion not to appoint counsel for capital state postconviction review unless the inmate could make a showing of "nonfrivolous claims."' 66 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Virginia law on several grounds.
One lesson from Giarratano is that the right to counsel is not as extensive as the right of access to the criminal process. 67 to distinguish between capital and noncapital cases, rejecting the respondents' arguments that the states were required to provide counsel because of the Eighth Amendment's "'evolving standards of decency"" ' and the need for accuracy in capital cases under the Due Process Clause. 74 It is the first opportunity to pursue claims such as ineffective assistance of counsel and the last opportunity to investigate fact-intensive claims such as actual innocence and prosecutorial misconduct.
Since Giarratano was decided eight years ago, the importance of providing counsel for capital state postconviction proceedings has increased. First, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996,175 which erects a number of procedural barriers to federal habeas review. In addition to banning successive federal habeas petitions, the AEDPA places an unprecedented statute of limitations on filing petitions and eliminates the federal courts' de novo standard of review.
7 6 The Act also attempts to induce the states to provide counsel at capital state postconviction proceedings by offering an even shorter statute of limitations on federal habeas petitions if the states "opt-in. '' 7 No federal court has found that a state has complied by providing adequate levels of funding and counsel.1 80 the Court affirmed that indigent death row inmates have a right to counsel at federal habeas hearings,'' but, without counsel at the state level, their constitutional claims will not be preserved for federal review. Federal courts currently find errors in over forty percent' t 2 of all capital cases; at one time errors were found in over seventy percent.1 8 3
Finally, in February 1997 the American Bar Association (ABA) responded to these changes by calling for a moratorium on the death penalty until the situation improves.'" Like the ABA resolution, this Note takes no position on the morality of the death penalty. Given that capital punishment is a reality, however, this Note argues that the Court needs to give death row inmates a meaningful first show by reconsidering Giarratano in the context of M.L.B. and the proposed fundamental rights exception.
Any challenge to Giarratano faces a formidable series of precedents. 5 The concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, however, provides a ray of hope. As the critical fifth vote, Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but refused to join the Giarratano Court's plurality opinion, writing separately to convey his ambivalence. Justice Kennedy recognized the importance of providing counsel at capital state postconviction proceedings:
It cannot be denied that collateral relief proceedings are a central part of the review process for prisoners sentenced to death ....
[A]
substantial proportion of those prisoners succeed in having their death sentences vacated in habeas corpus proceedings. The complexity of our jurisprudence in this area, moreover, makes it unlikely that capital defendants will be able to file successful petitions for collateral relief without the assistance of a person learned in the law. The case of Exzavious Lee Gibson, however, is the proof of injury that could change Justice Kennedy's mind.
C. The Case of Exzavious Lee Gibson
Twenty-four years old, indigent, and with an I.Q. of seventy-six, Gibson was the "first capital habeas petitioner in any state in the modem era of the death penalty to be forced to proceed without counsel at his habeas evidentiary hearing."' 9 Gibson was sentenced to death for robbing and killing a sixtynine-year-old grocer.' 191. Gibson allegedly stabbed the man 39 times. A woman who had seen Gibson running from the scene led police to his home. A trail of fresh blood led to Gibson's room. where police found him cowering in the closet. It came out at trial and at Gibson's state habeas heanng that Gibson's mother had been murdered, his father was absent, and the aunt who raised Gibson had abused him. 196. Rankin, supra note 9; see id. ("'.We don't think that the system benefits by having this inmate go through without counsel,' Wells said. ' We think that it makes a mockery of the system .... Mr. Gibson may as well be hung up from a tree out back."'). Wells was removed from the courtroom for her outbursts. See Woolner, Condemned, supra note 9.
197. See Herbert, supra note 9. Gibson filed a skeletal, pro se habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The petition was the idea of Wells's Georgia Resource Center in order to toll the statue of limitations before several new state habeas laws took effect. See Application for Certificate of Probable Cause to Appeal at 3, Gibson (No. 95-V-648). The Georgia Resource Center, citing the loss of congressional funding, said it could not represent Gibson because it had cut back its lawyers from eight to two. See Woolner, Condemned, supra note 9. Whitaker, the state's attorney, claimed that Wells had set up Gibson as a test case in order to challenge Georgia's policy. At the end of the hearing, Judge Overstrect asked Whitaker if there was anything Gibson should be instructed on before the hearing was adjourned. Whitaker said: "I think Mr. Gibson should be aware that this is his first habeas corpus proceeding, and that if he chooses to file another one, anything that he doesn't raise in this one is going to probably be found to be waived under Georgia law." Id. 
Lewis v. Casey and Actual Injury
The most recent precedent favoring Exzavious Gibson's right of access is Lewis v. Casey. 2 5 Although Lewis limited Bounds by rejecting a challenge to Arizona prison library facilities, it would help Gibson's case by requiring "actual injury." 2 0 6 The Lewis Court's actual injury requirement is consistent with the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence regarding the postconviction right to counsel, mirroring Justice Kennedy's concerns in Giarratano that "no prisoner on death row in Virginia has been unable to obtain counsel to represent him in postconviction proceedings.
Gibson's case satisfies the actual injury requirement. Gibson was the first death row inmate in Georgia to have a state postconviction hearing without the requested benefit of counsel, and the Court has recognized the importance of Illinois. 21t In both Williams and Gibson, the states discriminated against the indigent as a class of people. In Williams, indigency prevented inmates from paying fines and forced them to serve terms beyond the statutory maximum. In cases such as Gibson's, the lack of counsel prevents inmates from exercising their state and federal postconviction remedies. If it is indeed the case that about ninety-nine percent of death row inmates are indigent, 2 1
Georgia is discriminating against nearly all of its death row inmates. By making its postconviction proceedings "wholly contingent on one's ability to pay,s 21 2 Georgia is treating its death row inmates in the same way that the Court objected to in Williams and M.L.B.
Ex Parte Hull and Griffin
Two other pre-Bounds cases also buttress Gibson's argument: Griffin v. Illinois 2 3 and Ex parte Hull. 2 1 4 In Ex parte Hull, a state prison's "screening process" prevented inmates from filing federal habeas and civil rights lawsuits. The Hull Court held that there was a right to physical access and that the screening of federal petitions was forbidden. 1 Yet, by not providing counsel, Georgia is effectively screening which death row inmates may seek federal habeas review based on their indigency. Justice Souter's separate opinion in Lewis recognized that "the need for some form of legal assistance is even more obvious now than it was then, because the restrictions developed since Bounds have created a 'substantial risk' that prisoners proceeding without legal assistance will never be able to obtain review of the merits of their claims. 21 Another factor in labeling postconviction proceedings quasi-criminal is the risk of error. In M.LB., the petitioners pointed out that, of the eight appellate challenges to parental termination decisions in Mississippi from 1980 to 1996, the state supreme court reversed three. That 37.5% risk of error was a factor in the Court's decision to provide Brooks with a free transcript. Similarly, federal courts continue to find constitutional violations in 47% of capital cases; at one time, the number was as high as 73%. should not be required to pay for them. 27 Justice Thomas effectively borrowed Justice Harlan's analogy about the difference between excluding indigents from a free state university (disparate treatment) and forcing them to pay tuition (disparate impact).2 The difference, however, is that the state is not forcing anyone to seek an education at a state university.
Thomas's dissent also overlooks the government's monopoly on access to the judicial and political processes. 2 2 9 The Court has distinguished between the effect of a governmental monopoly and an affirmative right to governmental assistance. 2-0 This monopoly extends to the states' administration of capital punishment. Gibson's capital postconviction hearing was not his choice. Georgia imposed the ultimate sentence of death, and Gibson had no alternatives besides the state's judicial process. The governmental monopoly over the judicial process makes it imperative that the Court recognize a fundamental rights exception and provide a right to counsel at capital state postconviction review based on Griffin's right of access. Recent history suggests that the right of access is broader for transcript fees than it is for the right to counsel. Ross v. Moffitt 2 ' limited the right to counsel to first appeals as of right, refusing to extend it to discretionary appeals. 232 The Court again refused to find a general right to counsel for noncapital postconviction cases in Pennsylvania v. Every financial exaction which the State imposes on a uniform basis is more easily satisfied by the well-to-do than by the indigent. Yet I take it that no one would dispute the constitutional power of the State to levy a uniform sales tax, to charge tuition at a state university, to fix rates for the purchase of water from a municipal corporation, to impose a standard fine for criminal violations, or to establish minimum bail for various categories of offenses.
Id.
229. The history of the right to counsel before Gideon v. Wainwright, 235 however, demonstrates that the Court believed capital cases to be different, and to implicate greater concerns, than other types of cases. Over thirty years before Gideon, the Court reversed the death sentences of the Scottsboro Boys, seven young black men accused of raping two white women, because the state failed to appoint them counsel until the morning of the trial. z 6 In Griffin, Justice Frankfurter wrote that "a State need not equalize economic conditions. A man of means may be able to afford the retention of an expensive, able counsel not within reach of a poor man's purse. ' 237 Justice Frankfurter, however, assumed a different tone when discussing death sentences: "Since capital offenses are sui generis, a State may take account of the irrevocability of death by allowing appeals in capital cases and not in others." 23 Although absolute equality is not required, denying Gibson counsel at state postconviction proceedings is an "absolute deprivation ' 239 of his right of access to the criminal process.
Due Process Versus Equal Protection Fundamental Rights
There are two reasons that the Court should find a right to counsel at capital state postconviction proceedings under the Equal Protection Clause, but not under the Due Process Clause. Due process rights alleviating the effects of wealth discrimination are even more limited than equal protection rights. 24 Part of the reason, Justice Scalia has suggested, is that fundamental equal protection rights are "counterhistorical,, 24 not as deeply rooted in history, tradition, and precedent as due process rights. The Court 24 2 and scholars 24 3 have echoed Justice Scalia's counterhistorical claim.
Our constitutional standards confirm that the Due Process Clause is more wedded than the Equal Protection Clause to history and tradition. A fundamental due process right not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution must be (1) "'so implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"' that "'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed'"; 2 1 or (2) "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 2 45 By contrast, equal protection fundamental rights must be "explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution." 2 4 6 These implicit protections have enabled equal protection to adapt to our changing ideas about race relations, the right to vote, the right to travel, and the right of access to the criminal justice system. It also can adapt to our changing ideas about the death penalty appeals process. 247 The Court is also more likely to find a fundamental right under equal protection than due process because equal protection assuages the Court's concerns about stare decisis. 245 In recent years, the Court has been more willing to ignore stare decisis in cases involving equal protection 2 1 9 than in cases involving substantive due process. 50 The Court's recent stare decisis jurisprudence seems to confirm Justice Scalia's notions about equal protection being more counterhistorical than due process.
Federalism Concerns
Equal protection fundamental rights also trigger fewer federalism concerns.25t Under an equal protection rationale, the Court would not be telling the states to abandon either capital punishment or state postconviction review. Instead, the Court would be forbidding states from erecting procedures that jeopardize the fundamental rights of the poor. In M.L.B., the Court considered two main factors in applying equal protection analysis: (1) "the character and intensity of the individual interest at stake"; and (2) "the State's justification for its exaction. ' ' as 2 Concerning the effect of wealth discrimination, most states can satisfy rationality review because they have a legitimate interest in reducing the financial burden on their residents. This is why it is so important that the state law in Gibson's case "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution." 3 The fundamental right enables the Court to limit Davis's discriminatory purpose requirement, apply strict scrutiny, and more easily overcome any federalism concerns.
The Rehnquist Court is extremely concerned with issues of federalism.' Forcing Mississippi to provide free transcripts in parental termination cases is a small financial intrusion on state power. On the other hand, telling all thirtysix capital punishment states that they have to provide counsel at state postconviction proceedings for all indigent death row inmates is tantamount to acting like a "super-legislature.
' 255 Three additional explanations, however, may mollify the Court's potential federalism concerns. First, forcing the states to provide counsel may actually decrease rather than increase federal intrusion on state power.a2 6 If death row inmates have counsel at state postconviction review, there will be fewer successive federal habeas petitions because the inmates will have received every opportunity to pursue their claims. Thus, the federal courts can return death penalty cases to the states in a speedier fashion. This is true both as a practical matter and as a statutory matter, because congressional habeas reforms have shortened the statutes of limitations on federal habeas petitions if the states provide counsel at postconviction review.
7 Second, the federal government could provide indigents with counsel at capital state postconviction proceedings. The same counsel appointed with congressional funding at federal habeas review258 could assist indigent inmates at state habeas review. Although this would undoubtedly place a greater burden on the federal budget, it would increase the efficiency of the capital postconviction process by having the same lawyer at state and federal habeas proceedings. Finally, the Court should cast aside its federalism concerns when it comes to the death penalty because the Court traditionally has taken a hands-on approach in shaping this country's approach to capital punishment.
G. First-Shot Jurisprudence Revisited
The most disappointing aspect of the Giarratano Court's opinion was its refusal to distinguish between capital and noncapital cases.
5 9 Since 1976, the Court has been the architect of this country's death penalty assembly line.W The Court's legitimacy as the arbiter of countermajoritarian rights is at stake when it ignores the impact of its recent death penalty jurisprudence.' If the Court intends to help Congress and the state legislatures accelerate the appellate process by limiting successive federal habeas petitions, it should ensure indigent death row inmates that the first shot counts.
The Court ought to build on its two recent pieces of first-shot jurisprudence. In McFarland v. Scott,2 2 the Court upheld the right of death row inmates to obtain congressionally funded counsel, not only for their initial federal habeas hearings, but also in drafting their initial federal habeas petitions. 26 ' In Lonchar v. Thonas , ' the Court held that an original federal habeas petition cannot be denied even if it is submitted at the "eleventh hour., 265 The Lonchar Court held that the states' interests in finality were outweighed by the inmate's individual rights: "Dismissal of a first federal habeas petition is a particularly serious matter, for that dismissal denies the petitioner the protections of the Great Writ entirely, risking injury to an important interest in human liberty." 266 The important interests in human liberty at stake in McFarland and Lonchar-and the right to a meaningful initial federal habeas petition-are at stake in Gibson's case as well.
III. CONCLUSION
Thus far, the courts have been reluctant to apply wealth-based disparate impact theory to the criminal context. 267 The newly minted precedent, however, still has potential to remedy the effects of economic inequality. Griffin's right of access to the criminal process should be used to overrule Giarratano on equal protection grounds and to provide counsel for indigent death row inmates at state postconviction proceedings. The Court's ban on successive federal habeas petitions makes it imperative that indigent death row inmates get a meaningful first shot. The case of Exzavious Lee Gibson demonstrates the importance of providing counsel at least one time through the capital appellate process because of the fundamental right at stake. As Justice Brennan said in Furman v. Georgia, 268 capital inmates who are executed have "'lost the rights to have rights,"' and dead prisoners are forever deprived
